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In the three decades since the turning point in 1979 when China beganto open up to the market and to the rest of the world, it has experienceddouble-digit growth and an unprecedented rate of urbanisation. The
number of city dwellers stood at 190 million in 1979, representing 20% of
the total population; today it stands at 700 million, or 52% of the popula-
tion, (1) and the number of people living in Chinese cities swells by 15 to 20
million every year. Over the course of the next 15 years, the country’s cities
are expected to welcome 300 million new inhabitants, (2) equalling the num-
ber of houses in the whole of Europe today; in other words, by 2030 there
will be a billion urban inhabitants, and the urbanisation level will have risen
to 68%. (3) Chinese cities have become powerful production and wealth-
creation machines. This phenomenal development has enabled China to be-
come a major world power, and has paved the way for improved living
standards for its population, although major social disparities do remain.
However, it has also brought increasing pressure to bear on natural envi-
ronment, and has led to major environmental damage, seriously compro-
mising the quality of living conditions in China for the medium and long
term, triggering major threats to the availability and sustainability of natural
resources and to the health of the country’s population – and even its econ-
omy – and basically resulting in a critical situation today. (4) Given this con-
text, in which the equation between accelerated development and
urbanisation and protection of the environment has become an acute issue,
the question of how cities are planned and built, which largely determines
urban metabolism, is a strategic one that represents a major challenge to
the state of the environment in China and across the world.
The turning point in urban sustainability
proclaimed by the Chinese authorities
The Chinese authorities have been fully aware since 2006 of the serious
nature of the environmental challenges: the first official Chinese report on
the environment, conducted by SEPA/NBS, was published in 2005, and the
11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) recommended a new and more balanced
development model that gives greater consideration to the environment. (5)
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At that time, the authorities expedited the construction of a political, insti-
tutional, and legal framework for environmental matters. As far as urban
planning is concerned, new concepts, laws, programmes, and projects pro-
moting greater consideration for the environment began to see the light of
day in 2006. 
Two concepts were created with a view to forming the ultimate goal of
urban development in China: yongxu chengshi (similar to the Western idea
of a “sustainable city”) and hexie chengshi (“harmonious city,” a concept
favoured and backed by the central authorities at the UN-Habitat World
Urban Forum organised in Nanjing in 2008 (6) because they considered its
focus on the idea of seeking social, environmental, and temporal balance
and stability to be more deeply rooted in the Chinese way of thinking). A
new urban planning law approved in 2008, the “Urban and Rural Planning
Law” (chengxiang guihua fa), placed environmental questions at the heart
of the aims and principles assigned to territorial planning: (7) careful use of
land, improvement of the ecological environment, promotion of the rational
and sparing use of energy and natural resources, protection of land suitable
for cultivation and natural resources, etc. The environmental objective now
also features prominently in urban planning documents at the municipal
level, zongti guihua (“urban planning guidelines”), in which the essential prin-
ciples to be adhered to are as follows: sparing use of land and resources, pro-
tection of the environment, high economic efficiency, and social harmony. (8)
A number of national programmes have been launched to promote pilot
sustainable development cities. A first “eco-city” platform was developed
by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MoHURD, the
key urban planning ministry in China), and a second by the Ministry of En-
vironment Protection. (9) A new concept of “low-carbon cities” emerged in
2011 (with the 12th Five-Year Plan), along with a new national programme
selecting eight pilot cities and five pilot provinces. In addition to these na-
tional programmes, there has been a number of projects for new so-called
“ecological” cities since 2006. The most ambitious of these (the eco-cities
of Dongtan, Tianjin, Qingdao, Caofeidian, etc.) are the subject of interna-
tional cooperation (with Singaporean consortiums and American and north-
ern European companies and universities) and major communication
campaigns, but the actual substance of these projects is not currently clear.
The environmental theme has become so prominent and so key to the
urban question in China that any new urban development is now immedi-
ately given the “eco-city” stamp by the local authorities in charge of the
project. By taking up Western concepts of the sustainable city and promot-
ing them in an equally voluntary manner, the Chinese authorities have
shown their ambition to promote environmental excellence at an interna-
tional level. 
Therefore, a number of years ago, China appeared to embrace an environ-
mental watershed in the way in which it plans and builds cities, even in-
venting new ways of designing cities that demonstrate an exemplary level
of consideration for the environment. What really counts, however, is the
shift from words to action: has the way in which cities are planned and con-
structed on the ground changed to incorporate environmental principles? 
Research method
This research combined bibliographical work and fieldwork, involving
analysis of the Chinese pyramidal planning system and research into
actual urban operations (in particular that of the Suzhou Industrial
Park in Suzhou). 
The bibliographical work took in research based on a considerable
number of publications (academic, official reports and administrative
documents, press articles, etc.) dealing with urban development and
planning, as well as protection of the environment in China. In order
to dissect the urban planning procedure, I made particular use of the
analysis in the work Chengshi guihua yuanli (10) (“Principles of urban
planning”), which is viewed by many in China as the “bible of urban
planning.” It is the reference manual used by all urban planning stu-
dents and practitioners, basically setting out the road map for urban
planning.
The fieldwork involved approximately 50 semi-directive interviews
(each lasting for one-and-a-half to two hours and carried out in Eng-
lish or Chinese depending on the participants) conducted in 
Shanghai, Suzhou, and Beijing, during two field missions carried out
in April-May (11) and November-December 2012. Various types of ac-
tors were interviewed, including administrative officers within the
Shanghai and Suzhou city councils responsible for urban planning and
protection of the environment; managers of private companies man-
aging urban networks; urban planning architects working in research
consultancies and urban planning agencies; experts working in inter-
national institutions (OECD, French Development Agency); and re-
searchers and professors of urban planning and environmental studies
(Tongji, Tsinghua, ECNU, etc.). These interviews were supplemented
by site visits and field notes, in particular in Shanghai and Suzhou.
Research in the field reveals urban zoning
deployed on a vast scale
From an environmental point of view, Chinese “eco city” projects remain
largely at the intention stage: some announcements made amid great pomp
have not actually seen the light of day (for example, the flagship project in
Dongtan designed by Arup), (12) while others have been acted upon but con-
tain no significantly ecological aspects (such as the new city of Anting in
the Shanghai municipality), (13) and still others remain at a very early stage
of development (for example, the eco cities of Tianjin and Qingdao). A veil
has now been cast over the various national programmes for “sustainable
cities,” and it was not possible to find a single publication that shed light
on them. Similarly, the people I interviewed did not appear to have any spe-
cific information. One professor from Tongji University (14) gave us his opin-
ion: “Eco-cities? They are nothing but slogans! Maybe in 15 years we’ll be
able to talk seriously about sustainability in China.” Several other professors
in Tongji and Tsinghua confirmed this analysis. (15) Recent academic publi-
24 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 4 / 3
6. Wu Zhiqiang et al., Chengshi guihua yuanli (Principles of city planning), Tongji University, Zhong-
guo Jianzhu Gongye Chubanshe, 2010 (4th edition), pp. 70-75.
7. Wu Zhiqiang et al., Chengshi guihua yuanli, op. cit., p. 72.
8. Wu Zhiqiang et al., Chengshi guihua yuanli, op. cit., p. 278.
9. See Chien Shiuh-Shen, “Chinese eco-cities: A perspective of land-speculation-oriented local en-
trepreneurialism,” China Information, Vol. 27, 2013.
10. Wu Zhiqiang et al., Chengshi guihua yuanli, op. cit.
11. Some of the interviews in the first mission were carried out in collaboration with Dominique Lor-
rain.
12. See Frédéric Obringer, “Les écovilles en Chine. Du rêve nécessaire à la réalité marchande” (Eco-
cities in China: From necessary dream to market reality), in Mouvements, No. 60, 2009, 
pp. 29-36.
13. Interviews conducted with professors at Tongji University, April-May 2012 and November 2013.
14. Interview conducted on 24 April 2012. 
15. Interviews conducted in December 2012.
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cations (16) also reveal the lack of environmental substance of the urban op-
erations referred to as “eco-cities” or presented as exemplary from an en-
vironmental perspective in China.
The fact that no substantial eco-city has yet been completed should not
be a surprise in itself, given that the environmental watershed announced
by the authorities and the launch of the first eco-city projects are recent
events, dating back just eight years to 2006. What is of concern, however,
is that the new cities currently being built around the major urban centres
of the country (Shanghai, Suzhou, Tianjin, Chongqing, Wuhan, etc.) do not
seem to be very different from those that were built during the 1990s and
2000s, and appear to be far removed from what might commonly be held
up as the image of a “sustainable city.” (17) Indeed, visitors to these new cities
find themselves passing through urban sectors in which large single-func-
tion blocks (residential area, industrial zone, shopping precinct, administra-
tive area, etc.) are set side by side on huge areas of land, embodying
functionalist urban planning deployed on a vast scale.
The case of the new city of Suzhou Gongye Yuanqu, literally “Suzhou In-
dustrial Park” or “SIP,” provides a helpful illustration of this urban planning
model. Created in 1994 by the Chinese central government as part of a
strategic partnership with a Singaporean consortium, most of SIP was built
during the 2000s (it has now reached 80% completion). Administratively,
it is categorised as an urban district of the Suzhou municipality. Located to
the east of the old centre of Suzhou and in close proximity to Shanghai, it
has grown to cover a huge area of 288 km², and is home to approximately
800,000 inhabitants (more than half of whom are non-permanent resi-
dents) and nearly 10,000 companies (18) (including many multinationals). It
is a flagship operation in China in terms of economic development, urban
planning, and protection of the environment. Drawing on Singaporean
know-how and massive investments, SIP has grown at a swift and controlled
rate, and greater consideration has been shown to the environment com-
pared to other urban-industrial operations in China, (19) in particular as a re-
sult of systematic and integrated planning and management of the various
urban activities and the technical networks of essential services. However,
in terms of the choices made in the organisation of the city, SIP is typical
of new Chinese cities:
- a broad orthogonal road system (50 to 60 metres wide) forming a mas-
sive grid (two sets of two lanes or three sets of three lanes, which bear a
closer resemblance to motorways than to streets) ;
- an urban morphology featuring lines of large square blocks a few hun-
dred metres wide that are relatively closed off, each block having only one
or two entrances;
- an arrangement of urban functions split strictly into sectors. All the
blocks are single-function, and there is a very clear separation of functions
over the cityscape as a whole. (20)
The city covers an enormous area of 288 km², approximately 20km by
14km, which is nearly three times the size of the city of Paris. Everything is
arranged (immense) block by (immense) block, (immense) sector by (im-
mense) sector. When combined, the three factors described above concern-
ing the organisation of the city make it almost impossible to travel from
place to place in SIP without motorised transport. Moreover, the small num-
ber of previous inhabitants and the flat topography that characterise the
location mean that it was possible to assemble this “machine” of function-
alist urban planning with a minimal amount of political, social, and physical
friction; the result is a hyper-functional set-up dominated by its matrix
arrangement.
This urban planning model can be seen in each of China’s new cities (21) –
including in the eco-city of Tianjin (an urban operation started in 2007 and
today considered by many Chinese experts I interviewed in the country to
be the most ambitious project yet in environmental terms) and recent “low
carbon city” operations: “Compactness, density, functional mix, connectivity,
and promotion of soft transport modes are notions missing from most ex-
isting ‘low carbon city’ projects. China has a long way to go before it masters
the concepts and practices of sustainable urban development,” state experts
from the French Development Agency. (22) Therefore, the 288 km² SIP is not
the only city designed as a hyper-functionalist machine; the same model is
deployed in other massive spaces in China.
The aim of this article is to try to understand the major discrepancy be-
tween the concepts of sustainable urban development proclaimed by the
authorities and the reality on the ground by lifting the lid on the black box
of the political and administrative system of Chinese urban planning in order
to shed light on urban planning procedures currently being implemented in
China, the mechanics of drawing up and producing this urban machine, the
overall architecture, and the workings and the metrics behind its construc-
tion process, by examining the various steps of the process (from the cen-
trally-defined planning principles to the material construction of each urban
block) and by considering all the component parts of urban planning (hous-
ing, industrial, commercial and administrative activities, and infrastructure
networks – roads, water supplies, waste-water and rain-water management,
electricity, gas and heating supplies, waste management, etc.). What guiding
objectives, reasoning, principles, rules, tools, and operating standards lead
to the production of new Chinese cities in the form they currently take,
from the macro scale, nationally, through the planning of a new city, down
to the construction of a single block? This analysis makes it possible to ex-
amine the extent to which environmental principles have or have not been
incorporated into this urban planning procedure. 
This study also explores a research question of more general significance
that also concerns other developing countries, and which is keenly illus-
trated by the Chinese context: that of how to reconcile increasing concern
for the environment within the population and now officially shouldered
by the authorities, and the pursuit of development and urbanisation on a
massive scale, which requires colossal quantities of equipment and infra-
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16. C. P. Pow and Harvey Neo, “Seeing Red Over Green: Contesting Urban Sustainabilities in China,”
Urban Studies, Vol. 50, 2013; Chien Shiuh-Shen, “Chinese eco-cities: A perspective of land-specu-
lation-oriented local entrepreneurialism,” art. cit. 
17. At present, the concept of a “sustainable city” is more a goal that public authorities in developed
countries and some emerging countries are aiming to achieve than a clearly defined and well es-
tablished object, and the model “eco-city” has yet to be built. Nevertheless, certain countries and
cities, in particular in northern Europe, have gone a long way in incorporating new city planning
principles to promote greater protection of the environment since the 1990s, for example com-
pactness, a functional mix, promotion of non-polluting transport, etc.
18. Information gathered during interviews with administrative officers in SIP (April-May 2012).
19. Indeed, within China, SIP is universally considered to set the environmental benchmark owing to
the quality of the infrastructure and environmental services, landscaping, and environmental con-
trol of industrial activities, as well as the experiments in industrial and urban symbiosis (networks
for reusing energy resources between different activities, whether industrial or residential) carried
out there. See Rémi Curien and Dominique Lorrain, “Towards sustainable cities in China? Two in-
dustrial parks in the Yangzi delta,” International seminar: “From networked to post-networked ur-
banism: New infrastructure configurations and urban transitions,” École des Ponts ParisTech and
Université Paris Est, Autun, July 2012, 24 pages, www.enpc.fr/sites/default/files/green_cities-
curien-lorrain-oct2012.pdf (accessed on 18 May 2014).
20. Observations made in the field in April-May 2012.
21. As far as the municipalities of Shanghai and Suzhou in the Yangtze Delta are concerned: SND
(Suzhou New District), Kunshan, Changshu, Jinshan, Lingang, etc.
22. Jin Xiaoting et al., “Les villes chinoises, laboratoires de la sobriété énergétique?” (Chinese cities: A
testing ground for energy-saving?”, Urbanisme, No. 325, 2010.
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structure in order to accommodate between 15 and 20 million new city
dwellers annually. How can room be found for the necessity of environmen-
tal quality in urban planning when the structure of the operating context is
hyper-productivist and functionalist? How can a train travelling at high-
speed along a straight track be made to change direction?
The Chinese urban planning procedure
This study will first examine the planning procedure before analysing the
political and economic reasoning that underpins it. Two main characteristics
explain the urban model deployed over the country as a whole: the strict
pyramid structure of the Chinese planning system, and the hyper-function-
alist approach of the urban planning protocol.
A strict pyramid system
The Chinese political and administrative system is, as a whole, organised
into a strict vertical pyramid structure: the basic points originate in Beijing
and are then deployed across the territory, which is split into the different
interlinked administrative territorial levels (state; provinces, autonomous
municipalities, special administrative regions or autonomous regions; mu-
nicipalities or counties; towns or villages). (23)
The first key element is the allocation of ground to be urbanised. This is
the fundamental piece of data in the Chinese urban planning system. An
“overall land use plan”  (tudi liyong zongti guihua) – which adheres to the
principles of the “Land use law” (tudi guanli fa) (24) of the PRC – is defined
centrally by the Ministry of Land Resources. (25) Province by province, this
national plan designates the maximum area of ground that can be ur-
banised. Next, each province defines a land use plan that sets the maximum
amount of land that can be urbanised, municipality by municipality, and so
on down through the levels to the town level. (26) For example, the munici-
pality of Shanghai was not authorised to urbanise more than 100 km² of
land over the course of 2012, while Hangzhou was restricted to 50 km² and
Ningbo to 30 km². (27) This system of allocating land for urbanisation is
strictly controlled by the Ministry of Land Resources.
Secondly, the administrative and legal system of urban planning is also
organised into a pyramid structure. It is based upon a set of specific laws,
rules, and standards defined centrally and spread over the country as a
whole. (28) The urban planning guidelines and plans are part of an interlinked
administrative urban planning system.
The fundamental law is the “Urban and rural planning law” (chengxiang
guihua fa), which is itself determined by a law concerning the planning of
the economic and social development of the country. Drawn up by the Mo-
HURD and voted by the National People’s Congress of China, it defines the
broad principles to follow across the country as a whole. The law was last
revised in 2008, the aim being to introduce more sustainable planning. (29)
Technical rules and guides specify the methods and standards to be applied
nationally, generally, or by sector: “Procedure for drawing up urban planning”
(chengshi guihua bianzhi banfa), “Standards for planning and constructing
residential zones” (chengshi juzhuqu guihua sheji guifan), “Standards for plan-
ning and constructing roads” (chengshi daolu jiaotong guihua sheji guifan),
“Standards for planning and constructing water distribution systems” (geishui
guihua sheji guifan), and so on for electricity, gas, wastewater, waste, etc.
Next come the local technical regulations, which adjust the national stan-
dards in order to give greater consideration to the local context. These rules
and standards are revised on a regular basis, but everyone we interviewed
indicated that they had basically not changed since the 1990s.
Dealing in more specific terms with urban planning documents and guide-
lines, three different levels can be identified, ranging from the abstract to
the concrete and from the strategic to the operational: the quyu guihua
(“regional plan”) at the provincial level, the zongti guihua (“overall plan”)
and the xiangxi guihua (“detailed plan”) at the municipality or urban district
level. The purpose of the regional plan (quyu guihua) is to guide and organise
urban development at a regional level (economic centre, system of cities,
main industrial zones, main infrastructures, etc.). However, the two urban
planning documents that govern the planning and construction of a new
city are the overall plan (zongti guihua) and the detailed plan (xiangxi gui-
hua). The overall plan (zongti guihua) is a set of long-term strategic guide-
lines, in theory designed to take a 20-year period into account. It sets the
objectives, targets, and scales (economic, demographic, and spatial) for
urban development, and the principles of spatial organisation for urban de-
velopment in the planned area. (30) The detailed plan (xiangxi guihua) is a
specific plan for a city, and has an operational outlook that defines, for each
block of the area in question, the use, density, height, and volume of build-
ings, the proportion of green spaces, and the proportioning of public and
essential services (water, energy). (31) These various levels of urban planning
are interlinked, and the detailed plan (xiangxi guihua) must follow the prin-
ciples defined by the overall plan (zongti guihua), which itself must comply
with those defined by the regional plan (quyu guihua) that governs it. Each
administrative level is responsible for drawing up, applying, and controlling
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23. Interviews with professors from Tongji, April-May 2012. 
24. This law imposes a red line forming an area of 1,800 billion m² (which represents one-ninth of
the total surface area of the country) around land protected for agricultural use (interview with
a professor from Tongji, 24 April 2012).
25. Wu Zhiqiang et al., Chengshi guihua yuanli, op. cit., p. 209.
26. The system for allocating land to be urbanised is therefore very much organised into a pyramid
structure. However, there can be a margin for negotiation between two neighbouring adminis-
trative levels, meaning that the lower level can claim more land to urbanise from a higher level. 
27. Interview with a professor from Tongji, 10 December 2012.
28. Wu Zhiqiang et al., Chengshi guihua yuanli, op. cit., pp. 52-60.
29. Idem., pp. 50-65.
30. Idem., p. 174.
31. Idem., p. 300.
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Map 1 – Urban planning map of the Suzhou Industrial Park
in 2012.
© SIP Administration Committee
its urban planning documents. However, these also need to be approved by
the next adminsitrative level up in order to enter into force. For example,
the overall plan (zongti guihua) of a municipality must be approved by the
provincial government. Finally, the Urban and Rural planning law stipulates
that urban planning plans developed by a territorial level must be modified
when the administrative government one level higher introduces a planning
change, or when the State Council ratifies a revision of the planning princi-
ples. (32)
Therefore, from the system of allocating land to be urbanised to the sys-
tem of drawing up, approving, and modifying territorial planning documents,
not to mention the corpus of urban planning laws and standards, the entire
architecture of urban planning in China is interlinked and organised into a
strict pyramid structure. The next aspect to examine is the procedure for
planning a new Chinese city.
Planning a new city: A hyper-functionalist protocol
This aspect of the question is best explored from the municipality or urban
county level, at which the concrete planning of new cities takes place
through the overall plans (zongti guihua) and the detailed plans (xiangxi
guihua). This organisation of the urban planning protocol is based upon cor-
roborating information gathered from my interview campaigns, and on
analysis of the Chengshi guihua yuanli.
The first step involves deciding on the population growth to be incorpo-
rated into the land earmarked for urbanisation. This demographic forecast
determines the whole subsequent planning process. In Suzhou, for example,
the head of the construction and urban planning bureau of the municipal-
ity (33) told me that:
The urban planning bureau of the municipal government controls all
the planning of the different areas of Suzhou. We have an urban plan-
ning system to determine the distribution of the population between
SIP, SND, Kunshan, and Wujiang [different urban districts of Suzhou]…
The municipality of Suzhou is thus forecasting the number of people
and the main infrastructure (such as drinking water treatment sta-
tions and high capacity electricity power plants) it needs to put in
place on its territory. 
Based on this demographic growth forecast, planners set the number of
square metres of land that needs to be urbanised. A simple mathematical
formula is used to define this quantity; (34) this (A) is the product of the
quantity of population (P) multiplied by a coefficient of land use per inhab-
itant (a): A = P . a
This means that China has a set standard for urban land use per inhabitant,
determined by the national document “Standards for urban use and con-
struction” (Chengshi jianshe yongdi fenlei yu guihua jianshe yongdi
biaozhun), (35) which plays a key role in urban planning. This figure is approx-
imately 100m² per person, though it can vary from 60 to 120m² per person
depending on the size and characteristics of the city.
Once the number of square metres of land to be urbanised has been de-
fined, the proportions allocated to the various urban functions need to be
set. These proportions are broadly fixed at the national level, and can be
adjusted locally. (36) They are therefore fundamentally identical from one
new city to the next. The types of uses of land, established by the MoHURD
in 1990, have changed little since then (the impact of the most recent re-
vision, which took place in 2008 in order to comply with the new Urban
and Rural Planning Law, was minimal), and include a residential function,
an industrial function, a shopping function, a cultural and educational func-
tion, an administrative function, a public and essential service facilities and
infrastructures function, a storage function, a green spaces function, etc.
For example, in SIP, the industrial function currently covers 30% (37) of the
space, while 20% is given over to the residential function, with the rest of
the space being shared by the remaining functions.
Once decisions have been made with regard to the urban functions, they are
arranged in space according to a large-scale zoning (quhua) approach, in which
each block is allocated a single function: there are therefore residential zones,
industrial zones, shopping zones, cultural and educational zones, administrative
zones, green space zones, and so on. Functional zoning is stated to be a major
urban planning principle: “Each block has a defined function” (mei kuaidi dou
you yiding de yongtu). (38) The residential, shopping, and cultural and educa-
tional zones are generally arranged close to each other, whereas the industrial
zones are further away owing to the pollution that they generate. 
These first four steps are guided by the overall plan (zongti guihua), while
the subsequent actions are covered by the detailed plan (xiangxi guihua). 
Next, the layout of the construction is defined for each block. For a resi-
dential block, this means setting the quantity of homes and the density and
volume of construction. Similarly, for an industrial block, the quantity of
buildings and the construction volumes are determined. (39)
This is the basis upon which the essential service networks (water, elec-
tricity, gas, and wastewater) are proportioned, block by block, with different
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32. Idem., p. 178.
33. Interview conducted on 12 December 2012.
34. Wu Zhiqiang et al., Chengshi guihua yuanli, op. cit., pp. 269-270.
35. Idem., p. 270. Document published by the Ministry of Construction.
36. Idem., p. 215; this point was confirmed by my interview with the head of the city planning bureau
of SIP, 18 December 2012.
37. This proportion in SIP is slightly higher than that of a standard new city, because SIP has a more
pronounced industrial bearing. For example, the proportion in Shanghai is 26% (interview with a
professor from Tongji, 24 April 2012).
38. Wu Zhiqiang et al., Chengshi guihua yuanli, op. cit., p. 185.
39. Idem., p. 308.
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Photo 1 – Birdview of the Suzhou Industrial Park in 2012. 
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standards applied depending on the urban function. As pointed out above,
residential zones on the one hand, and industrial zones on the other, are
each grouped together, generally forming two very separate and quite dis-
tinct urban sectors. This use of large-scale zoning for the purpose of urban
planning has major implications when it comes to the design and man-
agement of essential service networks. The standards, systems, and net-
works for water (40) and energy distribution, and for wastewater disposal,
differ depending upon the zone (residential or industrial) that they serve.
The construction of new Chinese cities therefore proceeds according to a
hyper-quantitative, matrix-based functionalist method, reflected as a pyra-
mid structure from the plan allocating land to be urbanised, which is drawn
up in Beijing, to the proportioning of every urban block in each new city,
and is embodied by urban zoning on a vast scale. Everything revolves around
detailed standards and urban functions, leaving little room for qualitative
considerations, discussions airing other points of view as to how to lay out
cities, and dialogue with local stakeholders, in particular populations. This
quantitative outlook upon which urban planning is based in China is also
emphasised by researchers I interviewed:
Urban planning is a highly technical discipline in China. The work of
the Chinese urban planner consists of dealing with technical ques-
tions. The rest (such as the implications of choices made in urban
planning with regard to energy consumption or social integration)
does not concern him. (41)
Urban planning in China belongs purely to the realm of the hard sci-
ences (gongke), which completely overlooks social dimensions or the
concerns of the population. (42)
This model of large-scale zoning for the purpose of urban planning is
generally presented as the obvious choice by most urban planning prac-
titioners we interviewed, and by the Chengshi guihua yuanli, which offers
no scientific evidence of its validity. The following terms are most com-
monly used to justify zoning: heli (rational, logical) and qingxi (straight-
forward, clear-cut). Zoning appears to be the most rational model (the
term xiaolü – efficient – also crops up often) when it comes to construct-
ing a new city:
We think that this model [zoning] is a very good and very rational
(heli 合理) model, because there are major differences in the way
water is used in residential areas and industrial areas. (Manager of
Towngas, a company managing the water and gas distribution net-
works in SIP, translated from Chinese) (43)
Another virtue attributed to zoning is the clarity that it offers: “Functional
zoning (gongneng xing fenqu 功能性分区) guarantees a straightforward (qingxi
清晰) overall structure of the various urban activities” (44) (translated from Chi-
nese). The former head planner of SIP (45) even points to the clarity of zoning in
SIP, which he claims is greater than that of the other new Chinese cities:
Our industrial park is comparatively [as against other new cities or
development zones] more concentrated (jizhong 集中), the residen-
tial areas are more concentrated, and we have provided an even
clearer separation of the functions. It is something of an urban zoning
model in terms of clarity (chengshi fenqu de moshi 城市分区的模式).
(Translated from Chinese)
In addition to the clarity of the zoning, ideas such as order (youxu) and
security (anquan), which are notions of key importance in China, are often
used by urban planners. 
Most of all, this zoning model makes it possible to make considerable sav-
ings in costs related to urban planning and construction, (46) to construct
large cities very quickly, and therefore to urbanise the country in an accel-
erated manner.
The interviews conducted confirm that there has been little change in
urban planning and construction procedures used in China, and that the in-
tegration of environmental principles remains unsubstantial. Chinese aca-
demic experts generally swing between constructive criticism and fatalistic
pessimism. A professor at Tsinghua refers to “letters of good intentions,” an-
other confirms that there has been “no major change,” and a professor at
Tongji spoke of a “major discrepancy between stated aims and actual prac-
tice in reality.” (47)
When we spoke to urban planning practitioners responsible for urban op-
erations in Shanghai and Suzhou about the way in which they take the en-
vironmental dimension into consideration in their urban planning work
today, their answers reveal just how little bearing, if any, environmental
questions have on decisions concerning choices in urban organisation
(urban forms, the arrangement of urban functions, the design of technical
networks for essential services). The process of planning new cities does not
involve any overall and systemic consideration for environmental matters.
The specific points made in the answers we gathered were generally as fol-
lows:  
• “greening” (lühua), i.e., guaranteeing that large areas of ground will be
planted with vegetation;
• the energy efficiency of the buildings (even though this is not directly a
component of urban planning);
• the environmental assessment of each industrial activity (same obser-
vation as above);
• development of the public transportation offer (however, car ownership
and use are still rapidly increasing). 
Even the official reference manual, Chengshi guihua yuanli, subtly empha-
sises in several places the discrepancy between the law and the goals that
have been set on the one hand, and real-world practice on the other hand.
It points to the necessary development of methods of using land earmarked
for urban construction, with the increase in the importance of environmen-
tal concerns (p. 182). The “points to which the overall plan (zongti guihua)
for cities needs to give greater priority” (in other words, the points that are
not currently given sufficient consideration in China) include “protecting
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40. “In cities, different forms of water distribution can be adopted depending on whether the zone is
industrial or residential” (Wu Zhiqiang et al., Chengshi guihua yuanli, op. cit., p. 445).
41. Interviews with a city planning professor from Tongji, 20 April 2012.
42. Interview with a sociology professor from ECNU, 7 May 2012.
43. Interview on 11 December 2012.
44. Wu Zhiqiang et al., Chengshi guihua yuanli, op. cit., p. 286.
45. Interview on 13 December 2012.
46. The high speed of construction does not come without its own major problems in terms of quality
and durability. The rate of ageing of infrastructure built in recent years in China is especially high,
and a large portion of it will probably need to be rebuilt in the medium term (interview with one
of the experts from the French Development Agency and the OECD in Beijing, 29 November
2012). 
47. Interviews held respectively on 30 November 2012, 29 November 2012, and 20 April 2012.
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natural and cultural resources” (48) and “improving the management of public
infrastructure and services” (in particular the management of water, waste-
water, and waste) (p. 296).
This hyper-functionalist urban planning model has not yet been called
into question by Chinese decision-makers. A professor from Tongji (49) be-
lieves: 
We may have academic debates [concerning urban planning models],
but unfortunately urban planning continues to be physical-planning
oriented in today’s China.
Nevertheless, there are signs of a potential change. In academic and pro-
fessional circles concerned with urban planning, large-scale zoning is at-
tracting an increasing amount of criticism. Urban planning architecture
firms and consultancy businesses in China and internationally are proposing
increasingly mixed and sober urban models. (50) Although these new ideas
are gaining ground among urban planning researchers and practitioners in
China, they are not yet gaining traction on the ground, because political
decision-makers – who hold all the power in this area – have no intention
of challenging the existing urban planning and development procedure.
In order to help explain this functionalist pyramid model of planning in
China, it is helpful to examine the main cultural and political principles that
hold sway and the economic and institutional reasoning that underpins them.
The basic principles of the Chinese urban
planning procedure
Soviet influence and the modernist model
The Chinese planning procedure draws inspiration from Confucianism in
terms of order and hierarchy, but has, above all, been shaped by reference
to the Soviet example (51) (evoked in the 1950s to organise the reconstruc-
tion of the country and plan its industrialisation) and by its directed and
planned economic development and urban planning model. The omnipo-
tence of a single party, a top-down development process, the primacy of
the physical approach and technical rationality (urban planning seen as a
tool for bringing national economic planning to fruition), and a two-tier
system (the overall urban planning plans and detailed construction plans)
are all features borrowed from the Soviet model that have become rooted
in the Chinese system of urban planning. (52)
Since the 1980s, Soviet influence has been combined with the pursuit of a
modernist urban planning model involving large-scale zoning. The Athens
Charter (Yadian xianzhang) has occupied a prestigious position in the teaching
of urban planning since the 1980s in China, and continues to do so. (53) Many
experts consider this to represent Chinese urban planners’ fascination with
the American model of an urban grid deployed on a vast scale (the Chengshi
guihua yuanli dedicates a major section to Frank Lloyd Wright’s Broadacre
City), which they consider to be one of the benchmarks of modernity and
success. The grid shape also has Chinese roots (traditional grid plans). (54)
To this day, the urban planning system and procedure continue to be
deeply structured by the Soviet model. However, what has changed signif-
icantly since the 1980s and the economic reforms of the opening up of
China are the scale of urban development and the financing of urban plan-
ning, which are now driven by the market. (55) A Chinese expression coined
by a professor from Tongji (56) neatly sums up this new order: “The govern-
ment constructs the scene, the market plays the opera (zhengfu datai
shichang changxi). The government sets the rules of the urban planning
game and supervises its progress, but the main operational players (in terms
of the construction and management of facilities and infrastructures) are
now companies (property developers, construction companies, essential
service companies, etc.). The inherited model of directed functionalist plan-
ning defines the principles of urban planning and the zoning matrix, forming
the framework of the urban machine. The massive demands made on the
market and foreign capital to finance urban development extends the scale
and speed at which the matrix is deployed. 
The priority objective of maximising economic
growth 
The key that explains this hyper-functionalist urban machine is the absolute
priority given to accelerated growth set by the central Chinese government
in the 1980s, involving maximising the growth in Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) at all of the territorial levels in the country. Any concern of an environ-
mental or social nature is marginalised. The whole of the current political and
administrative system in China has been shaped with this aim in mind.
The first factor is the decentralisation of political power in terms of urban
development and planning, which took place in the 1980s. (57) Local political
leaders are appointed by their hierarchical superiors in the Communist
party-state, and progress in the organisational chart of the CCP depending
on the assessment made by the central party-state. Therefore, any action
by local authorities and planners depends on the requirements of the party-
state hierarchy, not the concerns of the local populations, (58) unlike the sit-
uation in Europe, where local power tends to focus on its relationship with
its citizens rather than with the central government, and where local urban
identities are therefore more pronounced. (59) This powerful central control
is also a major factor when it comes to explaining the uniform nature of
the new Chinese cities. The second factor is the way power is concentrated
at each territorial level in the hands of the local first secretary of the Party.
The third factor, and one that should not be underestimated, is the system
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48. Moreover, it is interesting to note that natural resources and cultural and historical heritage are
often combined and categorised in the same category in lists describing the various urban sectors
by subject: “protecting nature, cultural and historical heritage, and other elements of this type”
(ziran he lishi wenhua yichan deng fangmian de baohu) (p. 175); and therefore renwen yu ziran
ziyuan baohu (p. 296). Natural resources and cultural heritage may not be obvious bedfellows in
principle, and the main feature they share is that they are all “to be protected,” since they are se-
riously damaged by high-speed development.
49. Interview conducted on 10 December 2012.
50. Interviews with Chinese and foreign architects and city planners in Shanghai, May 2012.
51. “Our territorial planning system in China is imported from the Soviet model,” (former head planner
of SIP, interview conducted on 12 December 2012 – translated from Chinese).
52. In particular see: Anthony Yeh and Wu Fulong, “The transformation of the urban planning system
in China from a centrally-planned to transitional economy,” Progress in Planning, Vol. 51, 1999,
pp. 167-252.
53. Wu Zhiqiang et al., Chengshi guihua yuanli, op. cit., pp. 31-33.
54. Interview with a professor from Tsinghua, 30 November 2012.
55. The case of Suzhou provides an apt illustration of this. See Rémi Curien, “The growth of develop-
ment zones and the urban planning strategies in Suzhou,” 13 March 2013, http://urbachina.hy-
potheses.org/3401 (accessed on 18 May 2014).
56. Interview conducted on 4 December 2012.
57. In particular see Zhang Tingwei, “Planning Theory and Reform in Transitional China,” City Planning
Review, Vol. 32, 2008, pp. 15-24.
58. Interview with a sociology professor at ECNU, 7 May 2012.
59. In particular see Patrick Le Galès, Le retour des villes européennes (The return of European cities),
Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2011 (2nd edition).
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by which political functionaries are assessed. They are assessed every five
years, essentially on the criterion of growth in GDP in the territory they
govern (environmental criteria, for example, are still very marginal). (60) In
addition to the above, a fourth factor is the term of office. Each local leader
is required to change administrative territories every five years, which means
political and economic horizons are narrow, resulting in intense competition
between the political officers of different territories. They are therefore
mainly assessed on the basis of the level of economic growth of the territory
they have administered over the preceding five years, the main indicators
of this growth essentially being urbanisation and land rent (concession of
land to the private sector for use in emphyteutic leases). The officials who
make the fastest progress in the organisational chart of the Chinese party-
state are therefore those who develop their territory the fastest. (61) More-
over, because all power is concentrated in the hands of a single party, this
accelerated development is not limited by other forces (political, media, or
social), except in certain cases when popular action succeeds in preventing
the construction of waste or wastewater processing plants in the immediate
proximity of peoples’ homes.
These factors help explain the benefits of a functionalist pyramid method
of planning and the physical choice of large-scale urban zoning, for they
appear to provide the most effective means of constructing large cities very
quickly, of carrying out urbanisation on the largest scale and as quickly as
possible, and in so doing achieving the ultimate political goal of maximising
economic growth.
This urban entrepreneurialism has brought with it increasingly acute prob-
lems in terms of territorial coherence and environmental balance at a re-
gional level. Indeed, the institutional system automatically brings with it an
exacerbated level of competition between territories in the race to develop.
In Suzhou, for example, there is massive competition between the various
districts of the municipality (SND, SIP, Kunshan, Wujiang, and Zhangjiagang).
This competition also exists between Suzhou and the other municipalities
within Jiangsu Province (Nanjing, Wuxi, Changzhou, Zhenjiang, Yangzhou,
Taizhou, and Nantong), as well as with the municipality of Shanghai. (62) Also,
at the level of every new city, the result of this hyper-competitive institu-
tional set-up is that the local specificities of territories are reduced to a
minimum, development and planning is accelerated and beset by short-ter-
mism, and urban planning and construction timelines are compressed to
the extreme. The growing phenomenon of “ghost cities” (63) (sicheng, “dead
cities” in Chinese) – cities that have been built but have no inhabitants – il-
lustrates this problem of spatio-temporal coordination in terms of urban
supply and demand.
An increasing discrepancy between urban
planning and construction
Moreover, the Chinese urban machine, which is often portrayed as being
ordered and controlled, is not as closely managed as might be imagined. Al-
though the planning procedure analysed above does indeed define the
broad principles of new cities in terms of proportioning and organisation, it
seems that an increasingly wide gap then develops between aspects that
are established in urban planning documents and the actual contruction of
the various zones, blocks, and networks on the ground. (64) China has serious
problems in terms of applying urban planning plans and controlling con-
struction. The content of my interview with the head of the construction
and urban planning bureau of Suzhou municipality (65) supports this obser-
vation and expresses the instability of urban planning and the general pow-
erlessness of urban planners when they come up against all-powerful po-
litical power:
In Chinese, we have an expression: “planning? A plan drawn on a
piece of paper is worth less than a sentence from the boss” (guihua
guihua, zhishang huahua, bu ru lingdao yi ju hua). This means that in
China, planning is enormously dependent on the goodwill of the local
Party leader; even if we take many things into consideration in the
drawing-up and planning process, at the end of the day it depends
on the leader’s will, so the wishes of one man can result in many
changes. We also say “one leader = one plan” (yi ren shuji, yi ren gui-
hua), because in China the terms of office of city leaders are very
short. They generally have to change every three or five years, so
such-and-such leader produces one plan, and the next will probably
undo everything. (66) (Translated from Chinese)
Conclusion
This research shows that the construction of new Chinese cities starts
with a generic, hyper-quantitative, and productivist planning method, re-
flected as a pyramid structure over the whole country, and is embodied by
the accelerated construction of a hyper-functionalist urban machine. This
procedure was chosen by the Chinese authorities in order to carry out the
largest-scale, fastest, and most ordered urbanisation possible, and to thereby
achieve the ultimate goal of maximising economic growth. It has changed
very little since it was decided upon in the 1980s, and to this day is not sig-
nificantly called into question in China.
There are few signs of environmental principles being taken significantly
on board in the way cities are currently produced in China. Concepts and
aims of sustainable urban development are drawn up, but there are no op-
erational tools for incorporating these principles into the procedure of urban
planning and production. The vague nature of the environmental criteria
contrasts with the accuracy of the quantitative standards of zoning. Con-
versely, all the political reasoning that currently dominates urban develop-
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60. A large number of my interviews, both with academics and with actors involved in city planning
operations, converge on these two points. 
61. Owing to the rapid dwindling of arable land as a result of this rampant urbanisation, the central
government is now paying closer attention to the way in which land is made available for urban-
isation (Interviews with professors from Tsinghua and ECNU, December 2012). See also issue
2013/3 of China Perspectives dedicated to the urbanisation of rural China.
62. Furthermore, moves towards forming “groups of municipalities” have recently been set in motion
by the Chinese central government to better coordinate regional development (interview with a
researcher from ECNU, 7 December 2012).
63. Many experts I interviewed in various cities (in Shanghai, Suzhou, and Beijing) and institutions
(universities, international organisations, private firms) during my fieldwork use this term and em-
phasise the importance of the phenomenon. Two recent press articles also support this observa-
tion: “Chine: les villes fantômes défient les plans du pouvoir” (China: ghost cities challenge the
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01003-20130819ARTFIG00175-chine-les-villes-fantomes-defient-les-plans-du-pouvoir.php (ac-
cessed on 18 May 2014); “China’s Ghost Cities... Are Multiplying,” Zero Hedge, 21 September
2013, www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-09-21/chinas-ghost-cities-are-multiplying (accessed on
18 May 2014).
64. In particular see: Wu Fulong, “Re-orientation of the city plan: Strategic planning and design com-
petition in China,” Geoforum 38, 2007, pp. 379-392.
65. Interview conducted on 12 December 2012.
66. In this respect, the case of SIP is an exception in China.The initial plan was properly implemented
because of the strict legal framework for cooperation established between the Chinese and Sin-
gaporean parties, and the pressure exerted by the Singaporean party to ensure the initial plan
was adhered to. This stability and consistency of planning largely explain the status enjoyed by
SIP as a benchmark in China.
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ment is devoted to a massive scale and short-termism, and is far removed
from concerns of environmental quality or sobriety. China is continuing down
the road of accelerated development behind the wheel of a growing, hyper-
functionalist urban machine. In order to significantly incorporate the neces-
sity of environmental quality into the development and planning of Chinese
cities, this urban machine would need to undergo a full-scale transformation:  
• changing the gears of the machine: transforming every aspect of the
urban planning procedure, modifying the standards, revising the hyper-
quantitative and functionalist method currently in force, and robustly in-
troducing qualitative dimensions;
• changing the keys or the steering wheel of the machine: opting for a more
balanced and environment-conscious model for economic growth, em-
bedding environmental requirements much more deeply into the system
of assessing and promoting officers.
Central government plays a key role, because we have seen that the sys-
tem of urban planning and, more generally, the entire Chinese political sys-
tem, is authoritarian and pyramidal in structure: the basic points come from
the top of the Communist Party-State. China’s environmental future de-
pends on Beijing. 
However, a second parameter could play a defining role in coming years:
that of increasing popular pressure, which could force the Chinese author-
ities to make profound changes to the existing urban machine. At present
there are two main aspects to this popular pressure. On the one hand, there
have been increasing moves by rural inhabitants and floating populations
in cities (mingong) to defend their rights to social security, which could
force the authorities to start a revision of land ownership and a reform of
the hukou (the system concerned with civil status and the recording of in-
dividuals, which determines one’s access to social security; at present, min-
gong cannot obtain hukou in the city and therefore do not have the same
social rights as city residents who do hold this status), and could potentially
have major impacts on the speed of urbanisation, as well as on the urban
planning procedure, insofar as the existing municipal finance model is based
largely on savings made by denying mingong access to social security and
to urban services. On the other hand, the Chinese population is becoming
increasingly concerned with environmental problems generated by this de-
velopment model, and in particular with air pollution and water quality,
which directly affect people’s health. Increasing pressure is being placed on
the authorities, in particular through Internet-based social networks. Every
day, millions of Chinese people write and post messages on Weibo (the Chi-
nese version of Twitter) to expose the critical levels of pollution in the cities
and demand tangible improvement. Until now, the measures adopted in re-
sponse by Chinese leaders are merely papering over the cracks, and pollution
levels are therefore as high as ever, if not worse. Pressure from the popula-
tion is on the increase, and this level of popular mobilisation could ulti-
mately force the Chinese authorities to implement deeper changes to the
development model. 
z Translated by Will Thornely.
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